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A Safe Minimum Standard, an Elasticity of Substitution, and 
the Cleanup of the Ganges in Varanasi 
Abstract 
 Despite repeated calls for a thorough cleanup of water pollution in the Ganges river, there 
are only two papers in the social sciences by Batabyal and Beladi (2017, 2019) that have shed 
theoretical light on this cleanup problem and its connection to the sustainability of tourism in 
Varanasi. Hence, we extend the above mentioned analyses and focus on two specific questions. 
First, we introduce the notion of a safe minimum standard (SMS) into the study and show how to 
analyze a probabilistic model of the Ganges cleanup problem when the SMS is accounted for. 
Second, for a representative citizen of Varanasi, we study how the magnitude of the elasticity of 
substitution between a composite consumption good and water quality in the Ganges---modeled by 
the SMS---affects the tradeoff between consumption and water quality maintenance. 
Keywords: Ganges river, Safe Minimum Standard, Tourism, Uncertainty, Water Pollution 
JEL Codes: Q53, L83 
Recommendations for Resource Managers 
1. Successful cleanup policies entail high costs but probabilistically successful cleanup 
policies involve lower costs.  
2. If citizens of Varanasi are moderate environmentalists, then a decline in the water quality 
of the Ganges will lead only to a temporary loss of utility.  
3. If citizens of Varanasi are strict environmentalists then a decline in the water quality of the 
Ganges will lead to a permanent loss of utility. 
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1. Introduction  
 The longest river in India is the Ganges and this river occupies an essential place in the 
Hindu religion. Hindus generally consider the Ganges to be sacred and therefore millions of them 
standardly visit the holy city of Varanasi in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India to perform a 
purification ritual that involves, inter alia, bathing in the river. The city of Varanasi is significant 
not only for what Rinschede (1992) calls “religious tourism,” but also because it is one of the 
oldest populated cities in the world. Alley (1992) and Chitravanshi (2014) point out that in modern 
times, in addition to being a salient center for both domestic and foreign tourism, Varanasi is also 
prominent for its art, culture, and music. 
 Unfortunately, the Ganges has now become a dumping ground for all kind of pollutants. 
For instance, in Varanasi one can find animal carcasses, partially cremated corpses, and the 
material offerings of Hindu devotees in the river. In this regard, Dhillon (2014) maintains that 
32,000 bodies are cremated every year in Varanasi and that this process results in 300 tons of ash 
and 200 tons of half-burnt human flesh being dumped into the Ganges. Given this extremely 
unhealthy state of the river, questions are now regularly being asked about the sustainability of the 
tourism industry in Varanasi.  
 There have now been several calls for a thorough cleanup of the Ganges. Even so, Das and 
Tamminga (2012) rightly point out that these calls have led to little or no change in the extremely 
polluted status of the river. However, as noted by Batabyal and Beladi (2019), the Ganges now 
appears to have a champion in the current Indian Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi. After 
becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Modi promised to convert Varanasi into a vibrant city for tourists 
by initiating a major campaign to clean the Ganges.  
  4
This cleanup campaign has received a lot of publicity. From both environmental and 
touristic standpoints, it is clearly important that the campaign succeed. In this regard, Srinivas et al. 
(2017) have pointed out the damaging impacts that trace metals have on aquatic life in the Ganges. 
Srivastava et al. (2017) contend that that it is very important to maintain the quality of the water in 
the Ganges by controlling pollution. Inter alia, these researchers demonstrate that the presence of 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in the Ganges poses a significant health risk to humans. 
Finally, Srinivas et al. (2018) use what they call a geo-statistical overlay analysis to describe 
priority zones such as the Kanpur-Varanasi stretch in the Ganges where they believe that the 
implementation of sustainable management policies is particularly salient. 
Even though the studies mentioned in the preceding paragraph have improved our 
understanding of the nature of water pollution in the Ganges from a physical and a chemical 
sciences perspective, our central claim is that there are virtually no social science studies of the 
Ganges cleanup problem that are both dynamic and stochastic in terms of the methodology 
employed to analyze the underlying cleanup problem.4 In fact, to the best of our5 knowledge, 
there are only two papers by Batabyal and Beladi (2017, 2019) that have engaged in probabilistic 
modeling and thereby shed light on the economic aspects of the Ganges cleanup problem and its 
connection to the sustainability of tourism in Varanasi. Given the paucity of intertemporal and 
probabilistic explorations of the Ganges cleanup problem, we extend the analyses in Batabyal and 
                                                          
4  
We emphasize that the principal goal of this paper is to construct and analyze a mathematical model of the Ganges pollution cleanup 
problem. In particular, our aim here is not to conduct either a case study based or empirical analysis of this problem. Therefore, 
issues related to data collection, sampling, the identification and survey of experts, and potential problems stemming from a limited 
number of observations are irrelevant. The reader should note that our mathematical model based analysis is entirely consistent with 
the aims and scope of Natural Resource Modeling. In this regard, the web page of the journal clearly says that Natural Resource 
Modeling “is an international journal devoted to mathematical modeling of natural resource systems.” 
5  
We use the first person---and hence first person pronouns---in our paper because this usage is very common in the literature on 
natural resources and the environment. In addition, Natural Resource Modeling has frequently published papers written in the first 
person in the past. Two recent examples are Batabyal and Beladi (2019) and Ackleh et al. (2019). 
 
  5
Beladi (2017, 2019) by concentrating on two specific research questions.  
First, we introduce the notion of a safe minimum standard (SMS)6 into the analysis and 
then show how to construct and analyze a probabilistic model of the Ganges cleanup problem 
when the SMS is explicitly accounted for. Note that the SMS can be thought of as a minimally 
acceptable threshold for the provision of important ecosystem services. As such, we use this SMS 
notion in our analysis because it provides us with a straightforward way of modeling the idea that 
when managing pollution in the Ganges, the ability of this salient ecological-economic system to 
provide vital ecosystem services cannot be allowed to fall below a minimally acceptable threshold.  
Second, for a representative citizen of Varanasi, we study how the magnitude of the 
elasticity of substitution between a composite consumption good and water quality in the 
Ganges---modeled by the SMS---influences the tradeoff between consumption and the 
maintenance of water quality.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 presents a theoretical 
framework that is adapted from Antelman and Savage (1965) and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005) 
and that is used to analyze a probabilistic model of the Ganges cleanup problem in Varanasi. 
Section 2.2 derives analytic expressions for the long run expected cleanup cost incurred by a city 
authority (CA) who uses two different policies to undertake the cleanup task. Section 2.3 discusses 
a key criterion that determines which policy leads to lower long run expected cleanup costs. 
Section 3.1 presents a different theoretical framework that is adapted from Gueant et al. (2012) and 
that is used to examine the tradeoff between consumption and water quality faced by a 
                                                          
6  
More than sixty years ago, Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) suggested that when uncertainty and irreversibility are issues in natural resource 
management, the management function ought to pay attention to the establishment of what he called a “safe minimum standard 
(SMS).” The idea here is to manage an ecological-economic system such as the Ganges river so that this system’s ability to provide 
humans with a flow of ecosystem services does not fall below a particular standard, namely, the SMS.  
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representative citizen of Varanasi. Section 3.2 discusses the behavior of this representative 
citizen’s utility under alternate assumptions about the magnitude of a key elasticity of substitution. 
Section 3.3 comments on the policy implications of the results obtained in section 3.2. Section 4 
concludes and then discusses two ways in which the research delineated in this paper might be 
extended.  
2. A Stochastic Model of the Ganges Cleanup Problem 
2.1. The theoretical framework 
 Citizens of Varanasi and both religious and non-religious tourists visiting this city obtain a 
variety of goods and ecosystem services from the Ganges. These include, but are not limited to, 
fish for food, the performance of Hindu religious rituals, and the availability of boatable, bathable, 
and drinkable water. Now, consider a fixed zone along the Ganges in Varanasi with an inspection 
point at the end of this zone. A city authority (CA)7 inspects the water quality of the Ganges at this 
particular point.  
Because of the continued deposit of effluents into the Ganges from a variety of non-point 
sources, many of which are specific to Varanasi (see section 1), the water quality of the Ganges 
deteriorates probabilistically over time.8 Put differently, the state of the water quality in the 
Ganges declines stochastically over time. Following Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005), we model this 
feature by supposing that the state of the quality of water in the Ganges changes in accordance with 
a Brownian motion process with drift ߜ ൐ 0. 9 This is shown in figure 1 by the function that 
                                                          
7  
In Varanasi, an example of such a CA would be the Municipal Commissioner who is in charge of the Varanasi Municipal 
Corporation. 
8  
In the setting of this paper, the words “probabilistic” and “stochastic” are synonyms and therefore there is no difference between the 
notions of probabilistic deterioration and stochastic deterioration.  
9  
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begins at the origin and then zig-zags downward and rightward.10 When the state of the water  
Figure 1 about here 
quality in the Ganges crosses ॺ, this river is so polluted that it is unable to safely provide the 
citizens of Varanasi and tourists with the goods and services we alluded to in the preceding 
paragraph. From the perspective of the CA, state ॺ is the least acceptable state of water quality in 
the Ganges. In the remainder of this second section, we shall think of this state ॺ as one in which 
water quality is at the level of the so called SMS. This SMS state of water quality is shown by the 
horizontal red line in figure 1. In addition, when the state of the water quality in the Ganges is ॺ, 
the CA incurs a very high cost ܥॺ ൐ 0 to remove all pollutants from the designated zone of the 
Ganges and thereby bring the water quality state of the river to state 0. State 0 is at the origin of the 
graph depicted in figure 1. It is also the best possible state of the Ganges in the sense that water 
quality in this state is as high as possible. From the CA’s standpoint, a policy that involves 
essentially doing nothing and cleaning up the Ganges only when its water quality state reaches the 
SMS state is the passive policy. This policy is denoted by the letters ܲܲ in red in figure 1.  
Because water quality in the Ganges crossing state ॺ is the least acceptable outcome for 
the CA, it is certainly possible that this individual will want to clean up the designated zone of the 
Ganges before the water quality state of the river reaches the SMS state ॺ. To this end, we keep 
the cleanup problem interesting by supposing that if the water quality state of the Ganges is 
ݏ---shown in blue and measured along the vertical axis in figure 1---and the CA attempts to rid the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
See Ross (2014, pp. 607-644) for a textbook treatment of Brownian motion processes. Note that for our subsequent mathematical 
analysis to be valid, we need the drift ߜ ൐ 0 to be time-independent.  
1010  
According to Harris (2000, p. 156), a flow diagram is a graphic representation of the physical route or flow of people, materials, 
paperwork, vehicles, or communication associated with a process, procedure, plan or investigation. In this paper, the probabilistic 
decline of water quality over time (the flow) and the task of cleaning up pollution in the Ganges (the procedure) are clearly shown in 
figure 1. 
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designated zone of the river of all pollutants then this attempt will succeed with probability ݌ሺݏሻ ൐
0 and fail with complementary probability 1 െ ݌ሺݏሻ. If the cleanup is successful, then the water 
quality state of the Ganges returns to state 0 (the best possible state) and if it is unsuccessful then 
we suppose that the water quality state of the Ganges reaches ॺ, the least acceptable state. The 
cost of attempting a cleanup is denoted by ܥ௦ ൐ 0 and we have ܥॺ ൐ ܥ௦> 0. In contrast to the 
passive policy delineated in the preceding paragraph, we shall call a policy in which the CA 
attempts a cleanup in state ݏ, an active policy. This active policy is denoted by the letters ܣܲ in 
blue in figure 1.  
The reader should note the following aspect of our modeling strategy. The CA’s passive 
policy involves a higher cost ܥॺ ൐ 0 and hence this policy is assumed to be successful with 
probability one. In contrast, the active policy involves a lower cost ܥ௦ ൐ 0 and therefore this 
policy is assumed to be successful only with some positive probability that is strictly less than one. 
With this description of the model out of the way, our next task is to use renewal theory11 to derive 
closed-form expressions for the long run expected cleanup cost incurred by the city authority (CA) 
when he pursues first the active policy and then the passive policy.  
2.2. The long run expected cost expressions 
We begin by deriving the long run expected cost stemming from the use of the active policy 
or ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ in which the CA attempts a cleanup when the water quality state of the designated 
zone of the Ganges is ݏ and 0 ൏ ݏ ൏ ॺ. When the CA attempts a cleanup of the Ganges in water 
quality state ݏ and this cleanup is successful, the state (water quality) of the the Ganges returns to 
state 0 which is the best possible state with the highest possible water quality. This return of the 
                                                          
11  
See Tijms (2003, pp. 33-79) or Ross (2014, pp. 409-479) for lucid textbook accounts of renewal theory.  
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water quality state of the Ganges to state 0 constitutes what is known as a renewal and therefore we 
can use the well-known “renewal-reward theorem”12 to compute the ܮܴܧܥ஺௉.  
If we say that a cycle is completed every time a renewal occurs then the renewal-reward 
theorem tells us that with probability one, the long run expected reward is given by the expected 
return received in a cycle divided by the length of time it takes to complete this same cycle. The 
“return” referred to in the preceding sentence can either be negative such as a cost or positive such 
as profit. Therefore, the renewal-reward theorem applies to our problem where the return is a cost 
but it would also apply to problems in which the return is profit. Adapting the renewal-reward 
theorem to our problem, we deduce that the ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ we seek is given by  
 
ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ ൌ ாሾ௖௢௦௧	 ௣௘௥	 ௖௬௖௟௘ሿாሾ௟௘௡௚௧௛	 ௢௙	 ௖௬௖௟௘ሿ,     (1) 
 
where ܧሾ∙ሿ denotes the expectation operator. To compute the numerator of the ratio on the 
right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (1), observe that this numerator is given by a weighted sum of 
the two costs ܥ௦ and ܥॺ where the weights account for the fact that when the CA attempts a 
cleanup in state ݏ, his attempt will fail with probability 1 െ ݌ሺݏሻ. Putting these two pieces of 
information together, we get  
ܧሾܿ݋ݏݐ	 ݌݁ݎ	 ܿݕ݈ܿ݁ሿ ൌ ܥ௦ ൅ ሼ1 െ ݌ሺݏሻሽܥॺ.    (2) 
 The computation of the expected length of a cycle is more elaborate and in what follows, 
we proceed as in Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005). Let us represent the expected amount of time it 
takes the water quality state of the Ganges---that we are modeling with a Brownian motion 
                                                          
12  
See Tijms (2003, p. 41) or Ross (2014, p. 427) for textbook expositions of the renewal-reward theorem. 
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process---to reach state ݏ with the function ݄ሺݏሻ. Now, from definition 10.1 in Ross (2014, p. 
608) we know that a Brownian motion process has independent and stationary increments. 
Therefore, for any two states ݏ and ݐ, we can write  
݄ሺݏ ൅ ݐሻ ൌ ݄ሺݏሻ ൅ ݄ሺݐሻ.      (3) 
Equation (3) and the two aforementioned properties of a Brownian motion process together tell us 
that the function ݄ሺݏሻ is linear with the form ݄ሺݏሻ ൌ ߙݏ where ߙ is a constant. Following the 
procedure used in Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005, p. 46), we infer that ݄ሺݏሻ ൌ ݏ ߜ.⁄  This last result 
tells us that  
 
ܧሾ݈݁݊݃ݐ݄	 ݋݂	 ܿݕ݈ܿ݁ሿ ൌ ௦ఋ.      (4) 
 
Using equations (2) and (4) together, we obtain an expression for the ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ that we 
seek. Specifically, we get 
 
ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ ൌ ఋሾ஼ೞାሼଵି௣ሺ௦ሻሽ஼ॺሿ௦ .      (5) 
 
Equation (5) tells us that the long run expected cost of cleaning up the Ganges with the active 
policy is given by the ratio of the weighted sum of the two cost terms ܥ௦ and ܥॺ to the state ݏ, 0 ൏
ݏ ൏ ॺ, in which the cleanup is initiated.  
 Our next task is to ascertain the long run expected cost of cleaning up the Ganges with the 
passive policy or ܮܴܧܥ௉௉. Some thought ought to convince the reader that for this policy, the 
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expected cost per cycle or ܧሾܿ݋ݏݐ	 ݌݁ݎ	 ܿݕ݈ܿ݁ሿ ൌ ܥॺ. Following the logic of the derivation that 
led to equation (4), we infer that ܧሾ݈݁݊݃ݐ݄	 ݋݂	 ܿݕ݈ܿ݁ሿ ൌ ॺ ߜ.⁄  Putting these last two pieces of 
information together, we get  
 
ܮܴܧܥ௉௉ ൌ ఋ஼ॺॺ .       (6) 
 
In words, equation (6) tells us that the long run expected cost of cleaning up the Ganges using the 
passive policy is given by the product of the drift parameter ߜ of the Brownian motion process and 
the cost ܥॺ  to the SMS state ॺ.  We now discuss the criterion that plays a major role in 
determining whether the active policy or the passive policy leads to lower long run expected 
cleanup costs for the CA. 
2.3. The probability function 
 Inspection of equations (5) and (6) tells us that if we know that ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ ൏ ܮܴܧܥ௉௉ then it 
is rather straightforward to use calculus to determine the optimal water quality state in which the 
CA ought to begin the cleanup process to minimize the ܮܴܧܥ஺௉. On the other hand, if we know 
that ܮܴܧܥ஺௉ ൐ ܮܴܧܥ௉௉ then it is clear that our CA should commence no cleanup activities until 
the water quality state in the Ganges reaches the SMS state ॺ.  
 The problem for the CA lies in determining whether the active policy or the passive policy 
results in lower long run cleanup costs. Once again, inspection of equations (5) and (6) tells us that 
the probability function ݌ሺݏሻ is the key criterion that determines whether the CA ought to pursue 
the active or the passive policy in cleaning up the Ganges. To see this clearly, consider the 
following example in which the probability function is given by ݌ሺݏሻ ൌ 1 െ ݊ݏ ॺ⁄  where ݊ ൒ 1. 
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In this case, it is clear that 1 െ ݌ሺݏሻ ൌ ݊ݏ ॺ.⁄  Substituting this last expression in equation (5) and 
then simplifying the resulting expression, we obtain  
 




ॺ ൌ ܮܴܧܥ௉௉.    (7) 
 
The strict inequality in (7) tells us that when the probability function ݌ሺݏሻ ൌ 1 െ ݊ݏ ॺ,⁄  it 
is never optimal for the CA to clean up the Ganges using the active policy and that he is better off 
pursuing the passive policy which involves doing nothing until the water quality state in the 
Ganges declines to the SMS state ॺ. Having said this, note that this “be passive” result may well 
be replaced by a “be active” result for alternate functional forms for the probability function ݌ሺݏሻ. 
We now proceed to examine how the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between a 
composite consumption good and water quality in the Ganges---modeled by the SMS---influences 
the tradeoff between consumption and the maintenance of water quality faced by a representative 
citizen of Varanasi.  
3. The Tradeoff between Consumption and Water Quality 
3.1. The theoretical framework 
 When concluding their analysis of the Ganges cleanup problem, Batabyal and Beladi 
(2019) point out that it would be interesting to generalize their analysis by studying social welfare 
in Varansi in the context of the removal of water pollutants from the Ganges. We undertake this 
task by studying how a representative citizen of Varanasi values consumption and water quality in 
the Ganges, in the long run. This citizen understands that his ancient city is famous, at least in part, 
because the Ganges runs through it and because its status as a holy site is responsible for attracting 
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large numbers of religious and non-religious tourists to it.  
 Now, to fix ideas, let the representative Varanasi citizen’s utility at any time ݐ be defined 
over a composite consumption good ܥ௧  and environmental quality. The specific kind of 
environmental quality we have in mind here is the water quality of the Ganges. Water quality in 
general at time ݐ is denoted by ௧ܹ and the specific level of ௧ܹ that we shall be interested in is the 
fixed SMS level of water quality or ॺ. Therefore, in what follows, we shall set ௧ܹ ൌ ॺ. Next, let 
ߪ denote the constant elasticity of substitution between the composite consumption good and 
water quality in the Ganges. This elasticity measures how easy it is to compensate for decreased 
water quality in the Ganges by increasing the consumption of the composite good. Finally, we 
suppose that consumption in the Varanasi economy grows at a constant rate.  
 The representative Varanasi citizen’s utility function is given by 
 
ܷሺܥ௧, ௧ܹሻ ൌ ሼܥ௧
഑షభ
഑ ൅ ॺ഑షభ഑ ሽ ഑഑షభ.	      (8) 
 
The reader should note that when the elasticity of substitution ߪ → ∞,  there is perfect 
substitutability between the composite consumption good ܥ௧ and water quality ॺ. In contrast, 
when ߪ → 0, there is no substitutability at all between ܥ௧ and ॺ. With this description of the 
theoretical framework out of the way, we now proceed to analyze the behavior of the utility 
function in equation (8) under alternate assumptions about the magnitude of the elasticity of 
substitution ߪ.  
3.2. The salience of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution 
 From equation (8), it is clear that the representative citizen of Varanasi cares about water 
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quality in the Ganges. But how much does this individual care about water quality? To answer this 
question meaningfully, we need to have a way of quantifying the representative citizen’s caring. 
This quantification can be undertaken in a straightforward manner with the elasticity of 
substitution or ߪ parameter. Therefore, in what follows, we use ߪ to delineate two broad cases 
which correspond to two very different levels of caring about water quality in the Ganges. That 
said, the reader should note that we are using two broad values of ߪ	 ሺߪ ൐ 1	 ܽ݊݀	 ߪ ൏ 1ሻ 
because these values help us model and comprehend two different levels of caring about water 
quality in the Ganges. Finally, because ߪ is an exogenously given parameter, we are not interested 
in determining optimal values for this parameter.  
The first case we study is the scenario in which the elasticity of substitution ߪ ൐ 1. This is 
the case where the representative citizen of Varanasi cares about the water quality of the Ganges 
but not excessively so. In other words, this is the case where the representative citizen of Varanasi 
is a “modest environmentalist.” In this setting, we want to study the limiting behavior of the 
representative citizen’s utility as time ݐ → ∞.  To this end, let us express the representative 
Varanasi citizen’s utility in terms of consumption ܥ௧ and water quality divided by consumption or 
ॺ ܥ௧⁄ . We get 
 





.     (9) 
 
By assumption, we know that consumption ܥ௧ is growing at a constant rate and that ߪ ൐
1. Putting these two pieces of information together, we reason that in the long run, i.e., in the limit 
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as time ݐ → ∞, the ratio ሼॺ ܥ௧⁄ ሽ
഑షభ
഑  approaches zero. This last finding tells us that when ߪ ൐ 1, 
the utility of the representative citizen of Varanasi (the modest environmentalist) will grow at the 
same rate as consumption of the composite good. Note that for this line of reasoning to be valid, 
we need the SMS state ॺ to be constant.  
 Next, let us analyze the case where the elasticity of substitution ߪ ൏ 1. This corresponds 
to the case where the representative citizen of Varanasi cares greatly about water quality in the 
Ganges and hence this citizen can reasonably be thought of as a “serious environmentalist.” In 
contrast to the ߪ ൐ 1 case, we now write the utility function in terms of the SMS water quality ॺ 
and the ratio ॺ ܥ௧⁄ . We get  
 





.     (10) 
 
Because ߪ ൏ 1 by assumption, it is clear that ሺ1 െ ߪሻ ߪ⁄ ൐ 0. This last result tells us that 
in the limit as time ݐ → ∞, the ratio ሼॺ ܥ௧⁄ ሽ
భష഑
഑  approaches zero. This last finding tells us that 
when ߪ ൏ 1, the utility of the representative citizen of Varanasi (the serious environmentalist) 
will approach the constant value of ॺ. In other words, there now exists a limit on the maximum 
utility that the representative Varanasi citizen can attain. Let us now discuss the policy 
implications of the results we have obtained thus far in this section.  
3.3. Policy implications 
 In the first case studied in section 3.2 where the elasticity of substitution ߪ ൐ 1, the 
representative Varanasi citizen’s level of utility grows at the same rate as the consumption of the 
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composite good even though the water quality of the Ganges is fixed at the SMS level ॺ. This 
finding tells us that a decline in the quality of the water in the Ganges can be compensated by an 
increase in the consumption of the composite good. In other words, this finding tells us that 
because the representative Varanasi citizen’s long run utility depends essentially on consumption 
and consumption is assumed to be growing at an exogenously given constant rate, even when water 
quality in the Ganges declines, the associated loss in utility stemming from this decline is 
short-lived or temporary. 13  This is because eventually the representative Varanasi citizen’s 
consumption will have grown sufficiently to compensate for the reduction in water quality.  
 In contrast, in the second case analyzed in section 3.2 where ߪ ൏ 1, there is a clear limit on 
the utility that can be attained by the representative citizen of Varanasi. Therefore, in this case, a 
lowering of water quality in the Ganges will reduce this limit and hence lead to a permanent 
reduction in the utility of the representative citizen of Varanasi. Therefore, from the standpoint of 
the CA, it is a lot more important to avoid a decline in the water quality of the Ganges when the 
representative Varanasi citizen’s elasticity of substitution ߪ  between consumption and water 
quality is less than one. This completes our discussion of a SMS, an elasticity of substitution, and 
the cleanup of the Ganges in Varanasi. 
4. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we expanded upon the analyses in Batabyal and Beladi (2017, 2019) about 
the cleanup of the Ganges and focused on two particular research questions. First, we introduced 
the notion of a SMS into the analysis and then showed how to construct and analyze a probabilistic 
model of the Ganges cleanup problem when the SMS was explicitly accounted for. Second, we 
                                                          
13  
Note that this temporary decline in utility is not a definitional issue. 
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studied how the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between a composite consumption good 
and water quality in the Ganges, modeled by the SMS, influenced the tradeoff between 
consumption and water quality for a representative citizen of Varanasi.  
 Here are two suggestions for extending the research delineated in this paper. First, it would 
be interesting to see the extent to which one can obtain analytic results when working with a 
stochastic model in which changes in the water quality state of the Ganges are modeled not with a 
Brownian motion process but instead with a more general semi-Markov process. Second, it would 
be useful to determine the extent to which the work of Beladi et al. (2013) can be used to study the 
impact that price and/or quantity controls used by the CA---with the aim of improving water 
quality in the Ganges---have on the representative Varanasi citizen’s long run utility. Studies of the 
cleanup of the Ganges that incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide 
additional insights into the ways in which river water pollution affects the welfare of both tourists 


























1. Ackleh, A.S., Caswell, H., Chiquet, R.A., and Tang, T. 2019. Sensitivity analysis of the 
recovery time for a population under the impact of an environmental disturbance, Natural 
Resource Modeling, 32, 1-22. 
2. Alley, K.D. 1992. On the banks of the Ganga, Annals of Tourism Research, 19, 125-127. 
3. Antelman, G., and Savage, I.R. 1965. Surveillance problems: Wiener processes, Naval 
Research Logistics Quarterly, 12, 35-55. 
4. Batabyal, A.A., and Beladi, H. 2017. Cleaning the Ganges in Varanasi to attract tourists, 
Atlantic Economic Journal, 45, 511-513. 
5. Batabyal, A.A., and Beladi, H. 2019. Probabilistic Approaches to Cleaning the Ganges in 
Varanasi to Attract Tourists, Natural Resource Modeling, 32, 1-11. 
6. Batabyal, A.A., and Nijkamp, P. 2005. Alternate strategies for managing resistance to 
antibiotics and pesticides, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 7, 39-51. 
7. Beladi, H., Liu, L., and Oladi, R. 2013. On pollution permits and abatement, Economics 
Letters, 119, 302-305. 
8. Chitravanshi, R. 2014. Tourist guides to hold annual meeting in Varanasi, devise clean 
Ganga strategy, Business Standard, June 28, 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/tourist-guides-to-hold-annual-m
eeting-in-varanasi-devise-clean-ganga-strategy-114062500741_1.html, Accessed on 7 
December 2018. 
9. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. 1952. Resource Conservation. University of California Press, 
Berkeley, CA. 
  20
10. Das, P., and Tamminga, K.R. 2012. The Ganges and the GAP: An assessment of efforts to 
clean a sacred river, Sustainability, 4, 1647-1668. 
11. Dhillon, A. 2014. Ganga management, Post Magazine, South China Morning Post, 
http://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/article/1589301/ganga-management, 
Accessed on 7 December 2018. 
12. Gueant, O., Guesnerie, R., and Lasry, J. 2012. Ecological intuition versus economic 
“reason,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 14, 245-272.  
13. Harris, R.L. 2000. Information Graphics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
14. Rinschede, G. 1992. Forms of religious tourism, Annals of Tourism Research, 19, 51-67. 
15. Ross, S.M. 2014. Introduction to Probability Models, 11th edition. Academic Press, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
16. Srinivas, R., Singh, A.P., and Sharma, R. 2017. A scenario based impact assessment of 
trace metals on ecosystem of river Ganges using multivariate analysis coupled with fuzzy 
decision-making approach, Water Resources Management, 31, 4165-4185. 
17. Srinivas, R., Singh, A.P., Dhadse, K., Garg, C., and Deshmukh, A. 2018. Sustainable 
management of a river basin by integrating an improved fuzzy based hybridized SWOT 
model and geo-statistical weighted thematic overlay analysis, Journal of Hydrology, 563, 
92-105.  
18. Srivastava, P., Sreekrishnan, T.R., and Nema, A.K. 2017. Human health risk assessment 
and PAHs in a stretch of river Ganges near Kanpur, Environmental Monitoring and 
Assessment, 189, Article 445. 
19. Tijms, H.C. 2003. A First Course in Stochastic Models. Wiley, Chichester, UK.  
  21
 
